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Introduction: from representation to
poiesis
RICHARD ELDRIDGE
Twice upon a time, in both the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries
and again in the twentieth-century heydays of logical atomism and
logical positivism, the task of philosophy - so Richard Rorty1 and
Ian Hacking2 have reminded us - was to provide a critical theory of
representations of the world. By sorting representations - mental or
linguistic, as may be - into the accurate and well-founded vs. the
inaccurate and ill-founded, different cultural practices might be
submitted to critical judgment. This is possible insofar as "culture
is," in Rorty's words, "the assemblage of claims to knowledge,"3 or
perhaps, more weakly, in so far as cultural practices as various as
preparing food, making paintings, building houses, and telling
stories about ancestors all presuppose claims to knowledge. If the
representations or knowledge-claims that a given bit of culture either
is or presupposes are themselves in good order, then that bit of
culture is itself well-founded; if not, then not. If that - foxglove - is
in fact a poisonous plant, then (given a desire to avoid the poiso-
nous) one ought not to eat it; if mass is in fact an essential property
of physical objects, then one will do best to understand how physical
bodies will move under certain conditions by, among other things,
weighing them. Out of a critical theory of representations, philo-
sophy, it was hoped, would derive a critical theory of culture.
As Rorty, Hacking, and numerous other writers on the death of
epistemology have suggested, however, this project has also twice
foundered on a dilemma. What is the status of the intended theory of
representations itself? Either it is simply taken for granted that this
theory of representations itself represents representations correctly
and that the privileged set of first-order representations of the world
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that it favors is likewise accurate, in which case it is dogmatic and
uncritical; or this theory of representations is itself taken to be in
need of some guarantor of its accuracy and of the accuracy of the
first-order representations that it favors, in which case an infinite
regress ensues and the theory fails to provide a basis for assessing
culture and cultural practices. In Hegel's trenchant image, if reality
"is supposed to be brought nearer to us through this instrument [a
theory of representations together with a set of favored, first-order
representations], without anything in it being altered, like a bird
caught by a lime-twig, it [reality] would surely laugh our little ruse to
scorn, if it were not with us, in and for itself, all along, and of its own
volition."4
Not only does the effort to construct a critical theory of representa-
tions founder between dogmatism and skepticism, it also arguably
both reposes on inconsistent assumptions and misrepresents human
interests. Developing a line of argument that he sees as realized in
various ways in the writings of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein,
and Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor has claimed that the epistemolo-
gical project of constructing a critical theory of representations rests
on an incoherent picture of the single human knower as primitively
and self-sufficiently a subject or bearer of representational states.
Within the epistemological project, Taylor writes, the state of having
a representation in mind (whether mental or linguistic) is conceived
of as "an ultimately incoherent amalgam of two features: (a) these
states (the ideas) are self-enclosed, in the sense that they can be
accurately identified and described in abstraction from the 'outside'
world .. . and (b) they nevertheless point toward and represent
things in that world."5 Only if both (a) and (b) are true does the
project of stepping back from all presuppositions and commitments,
and thence reflectively testing representations for their accuracy,
make any sense. Yet the amalgam is incoherent. To the extent that
representations do present or point to things in the world, they are -
arguably - shapes or sound patterns or images that are themselves in
use in the world. Moreover, the interests that human beings have in
using representations to form judgments may well be much wider
than cognitive interests alone, and may be interests the pursuit of
which is effectively undermined by taking cognitive interests to be
of paramount importance. By attempting to stand back from all
presuppositions and commitments, in the cognitive interest of iden-
tifying unprejudiced and well-founded representations, we may not
only get nowhere: we may also distort and repress genuine but less
Introduction: from representation to poiesis
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627897.001
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 11 Oct 2019 at 13:53:12, subject to the
obviously cognitive interests that we do have - interests in justice or
freedom, say. In this way, as Hegel observes, "fear of error [within
the epistemological project] reveals itself rather as fear of the truth
[as truthful living and the satisfaction of genuine interests]."6
One way out of this impasse faced by representationalist epis-
temologies is to consider representations not as self-standing, reality-
related packets in either mind or language, but instead as markers or
signifiers in use in a population. In this way it becomes possible to
connect the uses of representations or signifiers with other actions in
practice that are carried out in the pursuit of other interests.
Thinking, or entertaining representations in mind, and using lin-
guistic representations in speaking and writing then become subsets
of the many things that human beings do in pursuing many and
various interests. Thought and language-use are reset within wider
frameworks of human practical life.
Depending, however, on what wider interests human beings are
taken to have and on how these wider frameworks of practical life
are taken to be set, this way of thinking about representations can
yield wildly different stances on human life and thought. Are there
any interests that are simply given, and, if so, how? Or are all
interests predominantly set by local and personal facticity, without
deeper constraints? Are human subjects capable of an adequate and
clear consciousness of their interests, however they are set? Or do
these interests, bound up with the possibilities of life that culture
affords, remain always in part opaque to reflective intelligence?
Different answers to these questions will yield radically different
ways of moving beyond Cartesian representationalism. Three broad
kinds of anti-Cartesian stances have been especially prominent of
late.
(1) Naturalism: It might be held that certain human interests -
pre-eminently those in food, clothing, shelter, freedom from pain
and misery, and so on - are simply given biologically. Human action
is dominated by these interests that are given naturally, and by
other, later interests (for example, in nurturing pride, in decoration)
that grow out of these earlier ones according to natural patterns of
growth and development. Theorists of thought, language, and action
as different from one another as Noam Chomsky, W. V. O. Quine,
Bernard Williams, J. L. Mackie, and E. O. Wilson all hold views of
this kind, differing only about which specific interests are first given
naturally and about the mental or neural mechanisms through which
those interests are implemented and developed. Behind our lives
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with representations, it is suggested, lie our lives as evolved,
biological systems within a larger system of physical nature.
(2) Linguistic idealism: It might be held that nothing governs
our actions, thoughts, and uses of language beside our own creations.
Concepts such as rightness, piety, goodness, honor, efficiency, and
duty, that human agents have typically, but variously, used to
describe and assess courses of action, are not built into the order of
nature, either in our brains or as part of reality. The fact that these
concepts vary widely in how they sort actions, without having a
common core, suggests that nothing but our own creativity as it
plays itself out in linguistic-social life lies behind them. As Rorty
observes, defending this view, "the notions of criteria and choice
(including that of 'arbitrary choice') are no longer in point when it
comes to changes from one language game to another. Europe did
not decide to accept the idiom of Romantic poetry, or of socialist
politics, or of Galilean mechanics. That sort of shift was no more an
act of will than it was a result of argument. Rather, Europe gradually
lost the habit of using certain words and gradually acquired the habit
of using others."7 It may not be that our words causally create
electrons or geological formations. But our words may be responsible
for dividing things up into the categories under which we take them
to fall in the course of pursuing our interests (themselves thus
created). Behind this life of language lies no punctual, individual,
cognizing subject, no given order of nature, and no God. Our
complex, conflicting, and always evolving habits of usage them-
selves determine how we classify and identify things - how we
represent them to ourselves - in ways that are then not under the
control of either reality or individual knowledge and will. Views of
this kind have been prominent in strains of recent literary theory
that have been influenced by Saussure's claims (themselves de-
tached from Saussure's program of generating a semantic science of
how conventional connections between signifiers and signfieds are
laid down) about the arbitrariness of the signifier. As Catherine
Belsey puts it, the thought is that "the world, which otherwise
without signification would be experienced as a continuum, is
divided up by language into entities which readily come to be
experienced as essentially different."8
(3) Cultural materialism: Partly making use of post-Saussurean
hostility to kinds written into the order of nature, but partly in
disappointment with idealism and in pursuit of the thought that
something, but not nature, must constrain human actions and the
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development of systems of representations (what would it be to
"experience the world as a continuum" anyway? - the thought
makes little sense), the thought arises that human acting, thinking,
and language-using are constrained or determined by sociological
configurations of power. Moving from Saussure to Marx, Foucault,
and Althusser (often by way of Freud and Lacan), the thought is that
human beings live out their lives, and take up courses of thought and
action, within social frameworks. These social frameworks are above
all frameworks of opposition and domination. In any known or
imaginable form of social life, certain rights and privileges are
somehow allotted differentially to members of opposed groups.
Women may not inherit property, while men can. Owners of the
instruments of production may "steal" embodied labor through the
mechanisms of capitalist production, while wage-workers cannot.
Gays may be diagnosed as mentally ill and subjected to courses of
medical treatment, while heterosexuals are regarded as normal and
healthy. These kinds of divisions - determined socially and histori-
cally, not by physical or biological nature alone - affect how people
think about themselves and their courses of action. The systems of
representations that people use to think about themselves and their
lives thus reflect their positions within one or another framework of
social antagonisms. No one thing - not nature, not consciousness
and will, not a history of technological development, not God -
stands behind the development of social frameworks that embody
domination. Rather, power is fluidly manifested in all social struc-
tures, without source and without a possibility of cure. As Foucault
puts it,
Power's condition of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which
permits one to understand its exercise, and which also makes it possible to
use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, must not
be set in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of
sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it
is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always
local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the
privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but
because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or
rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere;
not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.
And "Power," insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-
reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these
mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to
arrest their movement.9
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Against Cartesian conceptions of a punctual subject, self-suffi-
ciently sorting through its representations for reliability one by one,
each of these stances has considerable charm and power. Surely it is
right to see human action, thought, and language-use arising within
a natural framework; surely language evolves, often in ways that are
unpredictable by appeal to either natural processes or individual
will; surely the presence of changing varieties of domination in
social life is an historical fact that is of significance for how we act,
think, and use language. But each position also suffers from two
limitations. Within each stance a metaphysical scheme is dogmati-
cally assumed. Either the ultimate authority of nature over the
formation of thoughts and desires and social life is taken for granted,
or idealism is embraced, or power is cast as an ineliminable, but in
principle uncentered, unintelligible, and unassessable metaphysical
fact. Moreover, against the force of these metaphysical assumptions,
no morality of aspiration is articulable. In each case, the governing
way of thinking about action, thought, and language forces us toward
explaining how in fact human beings act, think, and use language,
without articulating how they might do these things better than they
do now. No routes toward partial, further rational independence and
social freedom are either discerned or discernible. The very ideas of
rational independence under norms and of social freedom become
nearly unintelligible. Thinking of our systems of representations,
and of our lives with them, as somehow determined - by nature, by
nothing, or by power, as may be - we then alternate between
(inconsistent) reversions to Cartesian voluntarism and clarity in
choice, ecstatic embraces of a post-modern sublime, of what Lyotard
calls "the unpresentable in presentation
 itself, that which denies
itself the solace of good forms,"10 and submission to natural or
cultural fate.
And this, we may think, cannot be right. Perhaps our lives and
thoughts and expressions are not our own as punctual, clairvoyant,
Cartesian, originative subjects, either actually or potentially. But can
it be that behind our lives and thoughts and expressions there is only
either physical-biological nature, or nothing, or power? Can we
simply know one of these metaphysical stances to be true? Or is it
rather that all at once, as beings who possess cognitive interests,
moral interests, and natural endowments, and who are set within
cultural matrices of both interest and domination, we nonetheless
dimly but actively refigure our representations and rearticulate our
interests?
Introduction: from representation to poiesis
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627897.001
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 11 Oct 2019 at 13:53:12, subject to the
To think about the human subject in this way, as departing from
multiple natural and cultural interests and endowments, thence
actively to refigure representations and effectively to rearticulate
interests, is to conceive of the human subject as a subject of and
within poiesis.11 As Plato and Aristotle use the term, poiesis is the
name for any activity of making, as opposed to theoria (observing,
theorizing) or praxis (acting, doing). More narrowly, it specifically
means the making of any imitative representation [mimesis), no
matter whether in prose or verse or painting or music (as a mimesis
of emotions).12 So used, poiesis is not solely the making of some-
thing that is merely fictional or unreal, since a mimesis or imitative
representation presents aspects of things that are. As Paul Shorey
usefully remarks, "Imitation means for [Plato and Aristotle] not only
the portrayal or description of visible and tangible things, but more
especially the communication of a mood or feeling, hence the (to a
modern) paradox that music is the most imitative of the arts."13
Poetic imitation is distinguished from the construction of a logos
(definition or account) through theoria in the interests of knowledge
or science [episteme). Thus the metaphysical-biological account of
man as a rational animal will be a part of episteme and a product of
theoria, not a poetic imitation. But poetic imitation is the means of
representing appearances, moods, characters, human moral and
political interests, and actions and their meanings, among many
other things. These are, we might say, things that are portrayed by us
in our speech - figurations of how things appear to us, of what our
interests are, of what our actions mean - not things that are captured
by us in the course of our scientific theorizing about nature. They are
representations of subjects, their characters, their interests, and their
possible stances in culture that are made by subjects and that in turn
help to make them, insofar as they make available certain routes of
self-construal and of action and identity in culture. Such figurations
will be, in Plato's and Aristotle's terminology, poetic representations,
mimemata that are products of poiesis, and they are far from insignif-
icant for human life, far from idle objects of aesthetic delectation.
The forming of poetic imitations, hence engaging in the activity
of poiesis, is arguably central to the life of any human subject. We
articulate and evince our characters in our actions, and we respond
continuously to our senses of the characters of others. We articulate
our interests - things that are not simply given in the order of
physical nature, in material culture, or by personal situation and
individual will - as we envision courses of action and character
Richard Eldridge
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formation that are fulfilling for us. These articulations of interests
and of possibilities of action and identity are the vehicles of our
cultures' various lives in us and of our lives in cultures, in such a
way that it is a mistake to think of these articulations as either
simply given, simply discovered, simply invented, or simply
willed. As products of poiesis, these articulations both represent
subjects and their interests, and yet also fail to do so: as products of
imaginative power calling to ways of cultural life not yet in being,
they allude to an ongoing and unmasterable historicity of human
life. We appear to ourselves and to one another under certain roles,
within plots of character development and of the pursuit of interest
that we inhabit. We appear to ourselves and to one another,
multiply and variously, as sons or daughters, as members of certain
political parties, as bearers of certain tastes or interests in the arts,
as lovers and co-workers, consumers and laborers, bosses and
correspondents.
These roles are in conflict with one another in the culture, and so
also in us, we who multiply inhabit them. Being a daughter, a
painter, a boss, and a politically engaged citizen calls for casts of
mind and ways of thinking about actions and their meanings that are
not easily reconciled with one another. The tensions or oppositions
here are so great that many recent writers - aware of the proliferation
of cultural roles and of the antagonisms that lie between such roles -
have begun to doubt whether there is any unity to the subject at all,
to doubt whether there is any locus of rational freedom within the
subject that embraces and organizes how one participates in the
multiple roles one occupies. Perhaps the subject is a nothing,
particularly if there is no self-present punctual subject, able effec-
tively on its own to pursue cognitive interests that are central to any
other interests it also has.
And yet we seem to wish effectively to integrate our various roles
with one another as coherent and complementary expressions of our
humanity and free personality. We appear to ourselves as having
various interests and desires and characters, as caring about various
things and occupying various social roles, and we wish to achieve
coherence and integrity in freely and reasonably bearing these
multiple cares and concerns, whose coherence and integrity are
readily, and painfully, felt to be lacking. Or, as Hegel remarks in
characterizing the sort of self-consciousness that comes with having
a propositional, judgmental consciousness, wherein one takes
oneself to be following rules in judging the contents of experience:
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The antithesis of [consciousness'] appearance and its truth has, however, for
its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this
unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is
Desire in general. In this sphere [of self-consciousness as involving an effort to
achieve its coherence, integrity, and unity] self-consciousness exhibits itself
as the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself
with itself becomes explicit for it [German: wird: becomes or comes about].14
For Hegel, the overcoming of the antithesis between self-
consciousness' housing in multiple roles, on the one hand, and
its unity to be achieved, on the other hand, involves at least the
development of a fully coherent culture, within which subjects will
recognize or acknowledge one another's rational humanity and free
personality as they are expressed in roles that are no longer brutely
at odds with one another. It is in and through these recognitions or
acknowledgments that are won from those with whom one shares a
coherent culture of rational freedom that one's own unity of self-
consciousness is achieved. "Self-consciousness exists in and for
itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it
exists only in being acknowledged [es ist nur als ein Anerkenntnes:
it is only as an object of recognition] .. .The detailed exposition of
the Notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will present us
with the process of Recognition [Anerkennung]."15
Even for Hegel, however, no substance or agency that is external
to human subjectivity guarantees that the achievement of a unified
self-consciousness in and through a coherent culture of rational
freedom will come off. To suppose there is some such substance or
agency would be dogmatically to assume a cosmological-metaphy-
sical stance, in advance of a critical examination of human sub-
jectivity and its always emerging possibilities of development.
Though Hegel himself looked forward to the imminent inauguration
of a coherent culture of freedom, whose structural institutions and
predominant modes of activity he undertook to describe, there is
nonetheless, in his thinking, nothing external to our own collective,
divided subjectivities and their efforts that is to bring such a culture
about. Geist or Spirit is, for Hegel, fully immanent within human
subjectivities in their natural and cultural situations, somewhat in
the way in which a personality is immanent in the ways in which
one takes an interest in, and responds to, things. A personality just
is certain patterns of shifting interest and responsiveness, partly
latent and partly actual in consciousness, not a separate something
that is behind them. Just so, for Hegel, with Geist or Spirit and
Richard Eldridge
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human subjectivities, together with their possibilities of develop-
ment, in their cultural and natural situations. The extent to which
the lack of any substance external to human subjectivities might,
contrary to Hegel's optimism, leave these subjectivities ever at odds
with one another and internally divided, without fully unified self-
consciousness, is perhaps a topic that is best left to us to dwell on,
as we consider our own possibilities of development, just as various
of Hegel's precursors and contemporaries did.
Strikingly, in rejecting the existence of any substance or agency
external to our collective, partially unified, partially divided subjec-
tivities - in rejecting dogmatic reliance on a metaphysical cosmology
- Hegel is in fact taking up a line of thought that is already power-
fully developed by Kant. Kant tells us that the law of duty - the law
which commands the formation of a rational-moral culture of
freedom as an earthly kingdom of ends, within which reciprocal
respect and recognition, and with them lived rational self-conscious-
ness, are achieved in daily routines - has no basis other than free
human personality itself, in its present, and persisting, partial unity
and partial self-dividedness.
Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming
or insinuating but requirest submission and yet seekest not to move the will
by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but only
holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind and yet gains
reluctant reverence (though not always obedience) - a law before which all
inclinations are dumb even though they secretly work against it: what origin
is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations and from
which to be descended is the indispensable condition of the only worth
which men can give themselves?
It cannot be less than something which elevates man above himself as a
part of the world of sense, something which connects him with an order of
things which only the understanding can think and which has under it the
entire world of sense, including the empirically determinable existence of
man in time, and the whole system of all ends which is alone suitable to
such unconditional practical laws as the moral. It is nothing else than
personality, i.e., the freedom and independence from the mechanism of
nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws
(pure practical laws given by its own reason), so that the person as belonging
to the world of sense is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to
the intelligible world.16
One way to sum up the thought that we are thus elevated by our free
personalities - in their partial unities and in their struggles to submit
inclinations to the law of freedom - above the world of sense, the
Introduction: from representation to poiesis
11
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627897.001
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 11 Oct 2019 at 13:53:12, subject to the
thought that we are able to articulate and envision, albeit in specific
ways, impersonal ideals of free activity and ways of pursuing of them,
is to say that human subjects are subjects in and through poiesis.
It is just this sense of the human subject as a subject in and
through poiesis that has been decisive for literary and poetic prac-
tice, now regarded not as the production of idle amusements, not as
controlled by the movements of material nature, not as arbitrarily
conventional, and not as reflecting only brute external realities of
power, but instead as a practice in and through which possibilities of
free human cultural activity are recalled, envisioned, and criticized.
In their groundbreaking The Literary Absolute: The Theory of
Literature in German Romanticism, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and
Jean-Luc Nancy sum up the Kantian sense of the human subject as a
subject in and through poiesis that has been decisive for serious
literary practice, now regarded as that into which philosophical
thinking about our possibilities of development necessarily migrates.
Kant rejects the existence of intellectual intuition, but retains a sense
of the human subject as dimly capable of rational self-consciousness
and self-legislated free action, out of its own resources. What results
is a sense of the human subject as bearing, intensely, the problem of
forming its own rational unity in and through the forming of a
rational culture. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy put it,
The first and foremost result [of Kant's transcendental Aesthetic or theory of
sensibility in the Critique of Pure Reason] is that there is no intuitus
originarius. Whether it was situated as arche or as telos, within the divine or
within the human (as either pure intellectual self-consciousness in Descartes
or pure empirical sensibility in Hume), what had heretofore ensured the
philosophical itself disappears. As a result, all that remains of the subject is
the "I" as an "empty form" (a pure logical necessity, said Kant; a gramma-
tical exigency, Nietzsche will say) that "accompanies my representations."
This is so because the form of time, which is the "form of the internal
sense," permits no substantial presentation. As is well known, the Kantian
"cogito" is empty.
... This weakening of the subject is accompanied by an apparently
compensatory "promotion" of the moral subject which, as we know,
launches a variety of philosophical "careers." ... As a moral subject, in sum,
the subject recovers none of its substance. Quite to the contrary, the question
of its unity, and thus of its very "being-subject," is brought to a pitch of high
tension.
... [One result of this conception of the subject is] the infinite character of
the process of human Bildung (with which Kant, in the eighteenth century,
departing radically from the Aufkldrung, represents the first view of history
that refers its telos to infinity).17
Richard Eldridge
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The subject is caught up in this movement of infinite Bildung, in
continually seeking to become unified and free, in and for itself and
in and for others. So conceived, the subject is both more than an
interference point set up by intersecting waves of cultural discourse
and less than free and transparent to itself, in bearing the problem of
achieving a not yet existent situated freedom.
Our subjectivity, as the locus of a project of freedom and a power
of poetically forming and critically assessing new visions of new
cultural routines, of itself commits us to this movement of Bildung.
Human subjectivity is free activity partially coming to be, in forming
a partially unified self-consciousness, its connected representations,
and the cultural routines in which it is to find itself. The movement
of poetic Bildung here is deeper than, or logically prior to, any
epistemological testing of already formed representations for corre-
spondence to reality or for coherence. It is a movement that is, for us,
not optional, but rather one we are always already caught within. As
Robert Pippin cogently remarks,
Kant attempts to show that in all empirical experience, or representation of
objects, and in all intentional activity, there simply are, necessarily, sponta-
neously self-legislated rules or conditions, that human awareness and action
is spontaneously self-determining, whether recognized as such or not. On
this reading, the Kantian "revolution" is not, at least not originally or
primarily, something we reject or join as a practical matter and so ... does
not involve (again, at least not originally) getting the unenlightened to start
doing something or acting differently. The first step is to realize what has
been involved all along in thinking, judging, and acting.18
The problem that human subjectivity bears, and is, is, one might say,
a problem simultaneously of the remembrance (overcoming repres-
sion and oppression), release, and perfection of its latent rational
spontaneity or freedom, in and along with others.
The products of such poetic, self-forming, self-shaping, efforts in
Bildung will naturally display a certain performativism, a certain
literariness or writerliness, freed from dogmatic or uncriticized
constraints of correspondence and coherence. Instead of testing self-
standing representations for their reliability, subjects here imagina-
tively remake their representations and themselves. The theoretical,
spectatorial standpoint is supplanted by engaged, conditioned activ-
ities of poetic making and remaking, in which subject and object are
inextricably caught in play. Inherited languages are infused with
exoticisms so as to introduce new powers of cultural formation. The
textual forms of the ongoing, poetico-critical refiguration of the
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subject and culture shift away from the closed treatise and toward
more occasional, improvisatory, open, and uncontrolled forms - the
fragment, the poem under continual revision, the polyphonic novel,
and critical readings of other texts. Sometimes there will be what
Kant called a "prevailing mood ... of weariness and complete
indifferentism,"19 or alternatively a certain lingering in the agonies
of not yet unified subjectivity, a lingering that will sometimes appear
politically quietistic and excessively self-absorbed. Sometimes there
will be the ecstasies of responsiveness to the not yet presentable
becoming present in culture and in oneself. Indifferentism, subjec-
tive agonism, and openness to sublimities here present themselves
as alternating moods and modalities of attention. Acts of poiesis,
carried out under these alternations, here aim at being what Kant
called "the origin, or at least the foreplay, of an approaching Recrea-
tion-Rebirth and Enlightenment of themselves [der Ursprung, wenig-
stens das Vorspiel einer nahen Umschaffung und Aufklarung
derselben20]" - where the foreplay (das Vorspiel) of this Recreation
of the subject and culture lasts a long time.
In and through this performative movement of poiesis aiming at
the Bildung simultaneously of human subjectivity and culture, there
will be also always a movement of remembrance or recollection
[anamnesis, Erinnerung; not mneme, Geddchtnis, not the personal
recall of events one has experienced), a kind of recollection of the
powers and possibilities of a unified self-consciousness that has
already been partly achieved, and of a culture that is already partly
expressive of freedom. Backward-looking moments of meditative
recollection will sit alongside, chasten, and contest forward-looking
moments of the unleashing of spontaneity in new directions. The
subject will try to recall or recapture a partial Bildung and self-
integration and also to unbind itself, to overcome dogmatic captivity
by anything that is given.
Poiesis so conceived is obviously an incoherent, unstable, self-
cancelling, and inconclusive form of subject activity. It will present
resistances to any immediately moralizing form of interpretation or
appropriation, and in doing so it will frustrate formulized receptions.
But, despite its frustrating and inconclusive character, it is a kind of
thinking - a scrutiny of our dim possibilities of freedom in culture
and of self-unity - that we may do ill to do without. As Adorno says
about what he calls open thinking:
The uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither subordinates his
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conscience nor permits himself to be terrorized into action, is in truth the
one who does not give up ... Open thinking points beyond itself. For its
part, such thinking takes a position as a figuration of praxis which is more
closely related to a praxis truly involved in change than is a position of
mere obedience for the sake of praxis.21
Not only, moreover, might we do ill to do without poiesis or open
thinking so conceived, it is also the case - if the Kantian-Hegelian
conception of the human subject as inherently a subject of and in
poiesis is right: and how are we to tell, except by entering into its
projects? - that poiesis is something we can do without only at the
price of the self-stultification and self-repression of our inherent
powers, of our very nature as subjects.
II
Each of the essays that are collected here moves broadly in the orbit
of the Kantian-Hegelian conception of the human subject as a
subject of and in poiesis. They track various modes - often them-
selves involving gender, class position, and national tradition - of
the uncovering and exercise of human poetic powers creatively to
envision a just and free culture, drawing on, but also against the
grain of, forms of cultural life that are already in place. At the same
time, these essays follow out moments of self-interrogation and self-
criticism in the uncovering and exercise of poetic powers, moments
in which the very sense that one possesses these powers is blocked
by an awareness of the force of antagonisms in culture, present and
foreseeable, hi each essay there is a pronounced emphasis on the
priority of the process of the continual refiguration (blending dis-
covery or acknowledgment with construction, in ways that are not
readily parted) of subjects and their cultures over the completed and
substantial nature of the subjects and the cultures that are thus
refigured. A sense of independence and nascent autonomy continu-
ously competes with a sense of incompleteness, fragility, and self-
dividedness. This is true both of the protagonists that are presented
or implied in the writings that these essays take up and, curiously, of
these essays themselves, so the writers of these essays participate in
just the agonistic logic of always refigurative self-consciousness that
they are undertaking to describe.
In chapter 2 "Confession and forgiveness: Hegel's poetics of
action," J. M. Bernstein elaborates Hegel's view of the self's ongoing
reflguration of itself, blending acknowledgment and projection. It is
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in and through action, where action essentially involves the taking
up and (at least sometimes) the conscientious recasting of norms,
that we are what we are. "It is," Hegel tells us, "the linguistically
actualized expressive dimension of action which is the means
whereby the self comes both to reveal and to take a stand upon itself
as a conscientious agent." Since there is in human action an
essential moment or dimension of taking a stand upon oneself and
against existing norms, it follows that human action as such is
inherently evil. Hence it inherently defeats the subject's efforts to
secure full, stable, and universal recognition of its expressive power
and full, self-recollective, self-identity. It always partly unmakes
what it would otherwise make. "Each act through which we would
affirm ourselves dispossesses us of the self we are and want to be."
As a result, for Hegel, transgression and the failures both of full
self-closure in self-recollection and of the perfection of human
community are neither accidental nor surpassable, but rather part of
the structure of human life. "Transgression is not the denial of a
positive norm but the creation of a breach, rent, tear or wound in the
body of united life (that, of course, exists in part through the
continual activities of rending and tearing) - which is what positive
norms are and represent if they but knew themselves aright."
Existing as human subjects only within this thus always torn, always
reforming body of united life, the only modalities of action through
which we might achieve such moments of recognition, self-recollec-
tion, and community with others as we are capable of are the
modalities of confession and forgiveness. Confession "is attempting
to establish the common" by allowing it to declare itself in oneself;
forgiveness lifts action out of the cycle of particular self-assertion
and revenge in which otherwise it would remain caught. But
because forgiveness, too, "is a performative act of recognition," it too
bears the stain of transgressive self-assertiveness that marks all
human action. "Forgiveness must express my particularity as well as
renouncing it." Together, then, confession and forgiveness are "cate-
gorial modalities of all actions that provide them with their spiritual
shape." One result of this shape of all human action is that we must
be open to the work of mourning, as opposed to the vengeful denials
and resentments of melancholia, as we are aware of those, both
living and dead, with whom we have achieved partial (albeit only
partial: there is no "uncontaminated universality") reciprocal recog-
nition. Within "contaminated universality" there will be, for us,
only vengefulness and violence, internal and external, in the
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absence of confession and forgiveness - the modalities of action
under which alone "united life" is possible.
Charles Altieri takes up the Hegelian thematics of action as
inherently involving poiesis, confession, and forgiveness in chapter
3, "The values of articulation: aesthetics after the aesthetic
ideology." Altieri begins from a certain dissatisfaction both with
what he calls "the aesthetic ideology" - the view that art is a
phenomenon essentially of aesthetic pleasure - and with recent
efforts to overturn that aesthetic ideology in favor of a conception of
the work of art as primarily a political instrument. Without denying
either the pleasures or the political instrumentality of art, Altieri
nonetheless finds both these stances to be rooted in modernity's
rejection of the abilities of art and poetry to serve as vehicles of truth.
As Adorno and Horkheimer notoriously observe in their Dialectic of
Enlightenment, "To the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce
to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; modern
positivism writes it off as literature."22 Once legitimate truth-seeking
is seen as the preserve solely of the sciences, art and poetry are
immediately reduced either to the status of providers of gratuitous,
belle-lettristic pleasures or to instrumentalities of power. (Bernstein
powerfully characterizes and criticizes modernity's reductions of
art's significances in his The Fate of Art, and he points to Kant,
together with Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, as gesturing towards
ways of reconceiving and recovering those significances.23)
Instead of accepting these reductions, which now present them-
selves as mirror-images of one another, of art to either the aesthetic
or the political, Altieri suggests that we might better revert to a pre-
modern.conception of the powers of art - the view of Longinus that
sees the work of art as carrying out a "work of articulation" that
makes routes of expressive power available to us. (In developing this
suggestion, Altieri is powerfully extending the lines of thinking of
his collection of essays Canons and Consequences: Reflections on
the Ethical Force of Imaginative Ideals.24) Unlike a measurement or
reproduction of something that is already in existence, an articula-
tion, as Altieri develops the term to describe the work and product of
poiesis, involves a movement from potentiality to actuality, a work
of forming and testing the subject and its commitments. Articulation
partially, but only partially, resolves the "inchoate pressures" of
multiple desires within specific settings by affording them modes of
release, expression, and development. When the work of poetic
articulation is carried out well, as Altieri suggests it is in Yeats'
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"Leda and the Swan" and in Shakespeare's Othello, then the poet
may be seen to be arriving at witness to our cultural failures, to
historical traumas, and to the brutalities of power, but in arriving at
this witness also to be bearing an affirmative power of judgment and
of the vision of something different. Altieri acknowledges that there
is a certain danger that thus thinking of poets as exemplary strong
articulators of judgment, vision, and routes of expression and desire
will itself be received as a "reactionary fantasy" that worships art
while leaving regnant political powers in place. In embracing this
danger, however, Altieri intimates that it is only by accepting certain
models of strong articulation, witness, and poetic vision - models
that might provoke us to our own originalities - that we might hope
to lead our lives as fallen subjects in culture and in political life
affirmatively. "Participation in how another mind makes use of
language .. . carries a significant model of our own freedom" to be
achieved in our own expressive acts.
Arthur C. Danto has been a powerful and prominent critic of the
Cartesian conception of the human subject as a punctual processor
of representations, themselves taken to stand in a problematic
relation to some external thing that causes them in us. Urging a
variant of the argument that Charles Taylor has elicited out of Hegel,
Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty, Danto has argued that
just to the extent that we can identify anything as a representation at
all, we are thereby committed to accepting the thought that there is a
real world apart from our representations, perhaps even a world of
which we are a part.25 In place of the Cartesian conception of the
human subject and of the primacy of cognitive interests in the life of
the subject, Danto has elaborated, in both his philosophical and his
critical writings on art, a conception of the human subject as coming
to its distinctively representational consciousness and self-con-
sciousness only in and through its formed social world, to which it
then reacts.26 The work of the artist, Danto writes, is that of
"inventing modes of embodying meanings she or he may share with
communities of very large circumference .. . [MJeanings more or less
come from the world in which the artist lives."27
In chapter 4, "In their own voice: philosophical writing and actual
experience," Danto takes up philosophically the ontology and the
practical ethics of the production of philosophy itself. Most "star-
philosophers," Danto notes (and surely this category includes pre-
eminently himself, who possesses an extraordinarily distinctive,
lapidary style), "have pretty distinct voices." Does it follow from this
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fact that their writings are products of merely personal, or perhaps
situated historical-personal, voice or style and vision? Embracing
this thought, Danto suggests, "vaporizes philosophical writing into
poetry" - an unhappy result - in so far as a concern for standing
truth, truth that survives changes in fashion, is lost.
That the traditional philosophical pursuit of standing truth can be
sustained is evident, Danto argues, in the writings of Wittgenstein
and Cavell. While these are two of the most writerly, most idiosyn-
cratic, philosophical intelligences who have ever lived, and while
much of the substance of their thinking is pre-eminently conveyed
in their respective styles, there are nonetheless some theses that can
be abstracted from their writings. Whether accepting limits is a good
thing, as Wittgenstein urges, or whether as Cavell claims "all selves
are sided," are matters that can be argued about. A concern for truth,
not just for voice, informs their quite stylized writings, and as
readers we must bring our own concern for truth to bear on the
claims that they urge on us.
But, while this is true, it is also true that not any thought can be
expressed in any voice. Certain voices and styles, themselves partly
personal and partly historically situated and generated, make certain
regions or aspects of truth available to us. In pursuing a neutral,
impersonal style for the formulation of theses, what Danto calls
"bottom line philosophy" - surely thinking of the routinized aca-
demic performances that compose much so-called professional phi-
losophy, analytic and Continental alike - is "abstract and distorted
and surrealistic." "We really do experience the world and life as
gendered beings" and as otherwise specifically historically situated
beings, "which means that the suppression of our facticities means a
distorted representation of the world, the world according to
Nobody." Instead of being anonymously professional and neutral, or
written by Nobody, the work of "creative philosophers . . . carries
what they have written and what they hope to write as the aura of a
total vision." It is impossible here not to think of the aura of the total
vision of Danto's writing as itself providing us a certain persuasive
articulation (in Altieri's terms) or poetic representation of how we
might bring our personal-historical styles and experiences into
fruitful engagement with our concern for truth. As simultaneously a
writer and a philosopher, Danto hopes, it seems, both to engage us
with his own writerly voice and also to say something true, in a
standing way, about the importance and possibility of blending
voice with truth-telling.
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Chapters 5 and 6 as it were split this suggestion, taking up
respectively the sides of the object of our characterizations and the
subject who does the characterizing. In chapter 5, "Poetry and truth-
conditions," Samuel Fleischacker takes up the topic of how things
are present to us at all. hi trying to make sense of our world, we are,
he notes, caught within "the general human situation of being
limited creatures who must always live beyond their limitations."
Surprising things can happen, in the arts, in the sciences, in politics,
and in daily life. Jackson Pollock produces a drip painting, or the
position and velocity of an electron turn out to be unmeasurable
simultaneously, and we do not know what to say. Nor are we at ease
with this. When some bit of experience thus challenges our concepts
and our capacities to make sense, then we construe that experience
as presenting a problem for us. Fleischacker persuasively analogizes
our need to make new sense of surprising experiences to our need to
arrive at a judgment about whether a contract may be enforced in
various kinds of unforeseen and largely unforeseeable circum-
stances. Something must be said, a verdict must be reached, but
what, and how?
Here, Fleischacker suggests, is where poetry comes in, and is
hence part of our normal equipment in responding to our worlds, hi
such unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances, what is needed
are creative judgments, employing indeterminate, not yet fully
worked out, concepts with indeterminate truth-conditions - the kind
of indeterminate concept that Kant says "beauty" is. Poetry helps to
provide us with such concepts, with new, indeterminate ways of
looking at new things that can help to support creative, reflective
judgments of our experiences and lead us toward new ways of
making sense, (hi chapter 8,1 similarly elaborate how art, in Kant's
terms, "bodies forth to sense" certain indeterminate ideals.)
"Poetry," Fleischacker claims, "thrives .. . at these margins .. .
concentrates on, and derives its power from ... the fact that we must
always project our commitments beyond what, strictly, we know."
Crucially, however, and in acceptance of something like Danto's
thoughts about the possibility of philosophical truth, this is not quite
the simpler Rortyan thought that, in Shelley's terms, "poets are the
unacknowledged legislators of the world,"28 for the work of poetry is
not prior to and independent of, but rather in its turn also presup-
poses, the works of science and of ordinary, "literal" assertion.
"Poetry and science make each other possible"; we must embrace
"both the determinacy of concepts of truth and their vulnerability to
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revision." In their dialectical interaction, poetry and science jointly
serve as open, self-correcting vehicles of the continual represencing
to us of the world.
Azade Seyhan takes up this theme of the continual, open-ended,
self-correcting represencing to us of the world under certain forms of
attention to it in chapter 6, "Fractal contours: chaos and system in
the Romantic fragment." Suppose, in the wake of Kant, we reject
dogmatism and strong forms of metaphysical and epistemological
realism, so that there is no certain method for limning the ultimate
structures of reality and for defending one's characterizations of
what is ultimate. But suppose also that we retain a sense of our
critical powers and possibilities, rather than accepting the Humean
views that nature, of which we are a part, is too strong for principle
and that our condition is whimsical. What forms of attention and
expression, Seyhan asks, will then be appropriate for subjects thus
situated, who retain powerful expressive aspirations but yet cannot
stably and securely grasp the ultimate under a method? How can
standing openness and a self-correcting character come to inhabit
our forms of attention and expression themselves?
Seyhan suggests that the Romantic fragment, particularly as it
was theorized and developed by Friedrich Schlegel, presents a
persuasive answer to these questions. "The fractured reality of the
world" - at the very least a world resistant to ultimate metaphy-
sical characterization - "found its coincidental form of expression
in the fragment." Its value as a form lies in its disseminating
power, its provocativeness, its presentation of continuing energies
of transformation in both the subject and the world that do not
arrive at stasis. "Fragments are symbolic markers of a 'chaotic'
progression that strives toward the cognition of an 'infinite reality.'
Their open resistances to redemptive attempts at final restorations
of unity and harmony embody an impetus for self-transformation."
The Romantic fragment manifests a tendency toward irony, incom-
prehensibility, and the enactment of a sense of sublime powers
never able to be housed. Yet it functions less as a simple embrace
of disorder and chaos than as vehicle for coming to terms with
always changing new orders of possibility in our cultural lives.
"The fragment, then, mediates between system and systemlessness,
attempts to function as a critical instrument for the review of
apperceptual regimes, and renegotiates the status of the poetic in
the anatomy of philosophical discourse." It presents its author,
and implicitly presents human subjects in general, as always cast
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on routes of self-revision, partly of their own making, and always
containing unanticipatable turnings.
In chapter 7, "The mind's horizon," Stanley Bates likewise takes
up the theme of the continuously self-revising character of the
human subject, likewise beginning from the Kantian "problematic of
the subject unpresentable to itself" enunciated by Lacoue-Labarthe
and Nancy. When one reviews Kant's sometime attempts to gesture
toward an ultimate, noumenal reality that is never present to us in
distinct existents or in our representations of them - the only
objective representations we are able to form - then one discovers
that there are "internal strains" that trouble this attempt. "From
what perspective could one be in a position to say what Kant says in
these passages ... We seem to be both within and beyond our own
experience, simultaneously." A similar internal strain, Bates argues,
also troubles Hegel's efforts to combine a conception of human
subjects as always acculturated, acculturating self-revising subjects
with the claim that we have arrived as human subjects at Absolute
Knowledge that includes our full and final knowledge of ourselves.
Once we trace out the internal strains that trouble these Kantian
and Hegelian efforts to characterize our position once and for all,
while yet acknowledging our lack of direct and unmediated contact
with anything ultimate, then we can see, Bates suggests, that our
position as subjects in nature and culture, as well as how to enact
that position, is always a problem for us. Awareness of this forces
certain themes on us:
(1) the idea that reason is not the most fundamental mode of human being in
the world but that something else, variously characterized as practice, doing,
passion, feeling, etc., is, (2) the idea that there is a kind of division in the
self, so that one may not know oneself fully (an idea something like that of
the unconscious), (3) the idea that the individual self is not a given entity,
but a goal to be sought in a process, potentially progressive, in which the self
constitutes itself ... (4) the idea that certain experiences, which might be
described as moments when the self-as-it-would-be transcends the self-as-it-
is, provide intimations of the directionality of this process - and that these
experiences fit comfortably under the rubric of the sublime, (5) the fact that
many of the subsequent authors who express these themes do so, not in
traditional (Descartes to Hegel) philosophical forms, but in other literary
genres - essays, fictions, parables, polemics, pseudo-scriptures, etc.
Bates then concludes by tracing "the dialectic of exaltation and
ordinariness, and the possibility of finding exaltation in ordinari-
ness" that is played out in Emerson's essays. What emerges there is
that "the moments of exalted awareness" that are achievable
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"cannot be sustained." Hence we bear a kind of "double conscious-
ness" of ourselves and our possibilities, as we are caught, in
"relations of self-succession" between moments of exaltation, self-
collection, integrity, and at-homeness, on the one hand, and
moments of doubt, despair, self-dispersion, and alienation, on the
other.
Following Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, both Bates and Seyhan
suggest that this kind of double consciousness, emerging out of the
reception of Kant, has massively informed much of the most com-
manding literary and philosophical work of the last two centuries,
including at least the English and American Romantics, Kierkegaard,
Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and poets of the American
sublime such as Wallace Stevens and William Carlos Williams,
among many others. In "Kant, Holderlin, and the Experience of
Longing," I undertake to track this sort of double consciousness as it
manifests itself in the texts of both Kant and Holderlin. Each of them
enacts, I claim, "a sense of the human person as caught between an
aspiration toward the ideal and the standing defeat of that aspira-
tion." Focusing in particular on Kant's historical essays, where his
conception of the perfection of the subject toward the always
deferred full articulation and release of its rational capacities in
lived, historical time is worked out, and on Holderlin's "Dichter-
beruf," "The Poet's Vocation," I argue in chapter 8, "Kant, Holderlin,
and the experience of longing," that a sense of one's own identity
and power is internally related to one's sense of the possibilities of a
culture of affirmative moral freedom. Hence the standing deferral of
the achievement of such a culture, while its call for us remains
present, throws one's own identity and integrity, perhaps one's very
sanity, into question. Whether elegiac consciousness of moral
freedom never quite coming to realization can itself sustain a kind of
measured, always shifting, self-integrity and sense of cultural possi-
bilities (rather than madness), therein motivating confession and a
sense of shared identity (as Bernstein describes them) and gratitude
(rather than revenge), presents itself here as an always open, and
perhaps unavoidable, question.
Michael Fischer hopes for a culture that, while imperfect and
suffused with antagonisms, is also informed by gratitude and a sense
of shared, affirmative possibilities. In chapter 9, "Wordsworth and
the reception of poetry," he suggests that Wordsworth's conception
of his poetry and his own poetic practice can help to nurture this
hope. In a pluralist age of multiple cultures, and of antagonisms
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within all cultures, it is rightly easy to distrust ethico-political
universals and claims to culture-transcendent rationality. But it is
equally hard to see how to inherit, revise, and share a culture
affirmatively in the absence of a common articulate conception of
what is worthwhile.
Here, Fischer, suggests, is where Wordsworth can help us. He is a
universalist - he seeks guiding ethico-politico-religious conceptions
for himself and for others - but he is not a transcendent or dogmatic
universalist. He seeks not to impose his judgments on others, but
instead to lead readers to decide for themselves, along his tracks,
what is worthwhile. He seeks "to affect readers without coercing
them." This leads Wordsworth, in his poetic practice, to solicit others
to sing with him, as he seeks to articulate "conditional or provisional
universals." "He wants readers to tap in themselves the imaginative
energy that he himself has employed in writing the poem."
Because, however, Wordsworth has no independent metaphysical
conception of the nature and proper objects of imaginative energy,
hence no rationally demonstrable standards for its appropriate
exercise (apart from whatever fitfully shows itself in that exercise
itself), an enormous anxiety about the inheritability of his work, and
beyond that about "the transmissibility of culture itself" results.
"Will readers - many of whom will be quite different from me -
exercise their imaginative energies along my routes, with anything
like my provisional results?" Wordsworth wonders, agonizes. Two
ways of responding to that anxious, self-interrogative wonder then
present themselves. One might foreclose it through violence, seeking
to force the agreement of others with one's valuations, as Robespierre
did, or as Wordsworth is tempted to do in fantasizing that he might
himself murder Robespierre. Or instead one might write, continuing
therein to articulate conditional universals and to acknowledge the
doubts that inevitably attach to doing so (thus bearing the kind of
double consciousness that Bates describes and that I see in Kant and
Holderlin). "Though Wordsworth feels the allure of the violence he
is contemplating, he rejects this option, turning instead to writing."
The provisional articulations of values (in Altieri's sense) that then
result from his writing are a way of continuing the traditional
philosophical dream of substituting reason for violence in human
relations, but now a poetic, nondogmatic reason - the very sort of
reasoned but poetic pursuit of valuations, Fischer suggests, that also
informs the best present feminist criticism, theory, and pedagogic
practice.
Richard Eldridge
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In chapter 10, "Self-consciousness, social guilt, and Romantic
poetry: Coleridge's Ancient Mariner and Wordsworth's Old Pedlar,"
Kenneth Johnston likewise scrutinizes how Wordsworth and Coler-
idge bear a double consciousness both of their identities as subjects
and of cultural possibilities. By the end of 1797, both Wordsworth
and Coleridge bear a "profoundly troubled commitment to the cause
of human possibility, democratically denned." Each of them had for
a time identified himself as a subject with the advancement of the
democratic promise of the French Revolution. Here Johnston
reminds us how powerful the association is between democratic
ideals and Enlightenment conceptions of human subjects as indivi-
dual bearers of representations. As the promise of the French revolu-
tion collapses into terror, however, Coleridge and Wordsworth find
themselves forced to reconsider both their conceptions of themselves
and their senses of the nature of the human subject generally. Direct
political action by individuals, alone or massed, based on their
representations of the world no longer seems a promising route
toward freedom. But withdrawal from all action seems to acquiesce
in the rule of the powers that be and to forego any sense of oneself as
a self-forming subject, potentially effective in historical time.
Johnston characterizes the strategy at which Coleridge and Words-
worth then arrive - that of becoming a poet "radically": that is, with
a new sense of oneself, one's commitments, complicities, and inter-
ests - as involving first bearing a sense of guilt and second trying to
define oneself as one who goes on nonetheless in bearing that sense,
principally by writing it out so that others may find themselves in it.
(Here Johnston echoes Bernstein on the logic of confession and
forgiveness as a vehicle for finding and forming a shared identity.)
Their writing involves not the purveying of a doctrine, but rather
"efforts at self-definition" of how one can be both guilty (for one's
impotences) and yet an affirmative human subject.
These efforts are evident first of all in the story-tellings on the
parts of the Ancient Mariner and the Old Pedlar. But the guilts that
they bear (the Mariner for killing the albatross; the Old Pedlar for
doing nothing in the face of Margaret's decline) and seek to
acknowledge are in turn both figurations, and provocations, of guilt
in their auditors (the Wedding Guest and the young Poet - for being
themselves transfixed by stories and caught within their own
stories, rather than attentive to material suffering). The guilt that all
these figures thus share in turn figures the guilts that Coleridge and
Wordsworth themselves bear for the failures of their own political
Introduction: from representation to poiesis
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involvements, aspirations, and commitments. In acknowledging
these guilts through their story-tellers, who then provoke a like
sense of guilt in their auditors, Coleridge and Wordsworth provoke
a similar acknowledgment of guilt in us, their readers. Such
ackowledgments (confessions in Bernstein's sense) of failures and
guilts are a central modality of such self-understanding and expia-
tion as there can be. "Each [Coleridge and Wordsworth] thus
presents not a metaphysical explanation for human suffering, but a
metapoetical situation that literally articulates the need for constant
telling (including revising) of tales of human suffering." In this
telling and revising, one, along with others, as an active human
subject who bears responsibilities and guilts (rather than being in
possession of political self-sufficiencies) - persists, Johnston sug-
gests, as a bearer of a quasi-secularized version of original sin.
Recognizing that one is a subject of this kind - as these poems
prompt us to do - is, Johnston argues, less the path of political
quietism than it is the way to any sense of human life, political or
otherwise, that is worthy of the name.
Each of the contributions so far has dwelt on a conception of the
human subject as divided within itself. Human subjects have been
cast as bearing a double consciousness of aspirations and their
defeat. They are seen as possessing a partly accomplished power to
transform culture, but also as suffering guilt over failures of attention
and responsiveness. Is this sort of sense of the human subject simply
parcelled out among all of us, so that any poet, possessed of and
enacting enough self-consciousness, might speak for us, might
express a shared sense of subjectivity? Or does it make a difference
to the sense one has of oneself as a subject that one is a woman?
"What is it," Christine Battersby asks, in chapter 11, "Her blood and
his mirror: Mary Coleridge, Luce Irigaray, and the female self," "to
write as a woman?"
Here Battersby finds that there are indeed some important specifi-
cities to the female subject position. It is not that there is an
ahistorical feminine style - involving, say, gentleness and emotional
attunement - into which woman writers naturally fall. To think this,
Battersby argues, is to essentialize away history and its possibilities
of alternative subject positions. But there is nonetheless a specifi-
cally female, not feminine, subject position that is evident in the
poetry of Mary Elizabeth Coleridge and the theoretical writings of
Luce Irigaray. This female subject position is specifically historically
allotted to members of the female sex, who are forced by their sex
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(itself partly a constructed, partly a given category, involving -
Battersby suggests - an interfusion of metaphysics and history) to
react against a specific literary and philosophical tradition.
Traditionally, Battersby argues, in male-dominated philosophy
and letters, one became an accomplished, exemplary, fully self-
conscious human subjectivity - a genius - by becoming an androgy-
nous or feminized male. (Here Battersby draws on her powerful
analysis of gendered Romantic genius in her Gender and Genius:
Towards a Feminist Aesthetics.29) Occupying this position is evi-
dently impossible for women. Both Mary Elizabeth Coleridge and
Luce Irigaray note "their own incapacity as female to occupy that
subject position," and they seek therefore to "reconstruct a female
subject position." While they cannot take up the modes of the
bearing of affirmative, expressive power that have been typical in
our culture, they nonetheless refuse to abandon the pursuit of
expressiveness and a sense of oneself as a subject who bears power
in and through culture.
Caught between the appeal of their literary-philosophical tradition
in offering models of cultural power, on the one hand, and that
tradition's specific rejection of them as female subjects, on the other,
Coleridge and Irigaray enact a specific awareness of their "indetermi-
nate desire" and of their "incompleteness" and "woundedness," as
they find themselves unable to enter into the routes of transcendence
of the given that our culture has traditionally held open for some.
"The female poet," Battersby writes, "retains the horror of the flesh
whilst simultaneously blocking traditional models of transcen-
dence." Coleridge "seems entirely caught up with the paradoxes and
the contraries of the other within," in possession of indeterminate
desire and a distress that is "unsanctified" by any vehicle for its
working through and overcoming.
Yet what Coleridge experiences as the woundedness, indetermi-
nate desire, and unsanctified distress of the female subject position
may also, Battersby argues, itself be productive and affirming.
Elaborating Irigaray's work on the Thesmophoria festivities, Bat-
tersby suggests that "what was celebrated in these all-female spaces
was a form of identity in which the self was relational, and in which
otherness extruded out of (and was then reincorporated within) the
female self via relationships of gift, birth, ripening and (productive)
decay." Perhaps, Battersby intimates, female subject-position
writing that is continuous with such ritual celebrations can provide
a more persuasive model of the sustenance of human identity
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generally than the post-Platonic male models of transcendence of the
given that we have mostly inherited from our traditions.
Whether, how - under what modalities of practice - , and to what
extent self-integrity is possible for us, through coming to achieve
reciprocal recognition in a perfected culture, where both self-
integrity and the perfection of culture are envisioned through
poiesis, is the issue around which all the contributions to this
volume center. How, if at all, might we come to be affirmatively
free human subjects in culture? Is this either possible or desirable?
These questions are the focus of attention in chapter 12, "Scene: an
exchange of letters," the contribution of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
and Jean-Luc Nancy, hi moving through this field of concerns,
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy are meditating, roughly fifteen years
later, on the fundamental issues raised by their epochal 1978 book
L'absolu litteraire - the book from which Seyhan and Bates expli-
citly, and several other contributors implicitly, take their points of
departure.
That book - we may now recall from these other contributions -
enunciates the Kantian and post-Kantian problematic of the subject
not present to itself. That is, in The Literary Absolute Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy describe the post-Kantian sense of the human
subject as always in process, bearing a kind of decentered subjec-
tivity always in reformation, in and through its poetic and critical
envisionings of itself and its situation. Those who bear this sense of
themselves as subjects - pre-eminently Friedrich Schlegel - hence
find their philosophical concerns for self-integrity, freedom, and the
perfection of culture migrating into poetry, or better yet into a kind
of philosophico-poetico-criticism, wherein disciplinary distinctions
break down, hi this way, these figures continue the concerns of
philosophy by another means. For the modern, Romantic subjects
who bear this sense of themselves - for those who have become
poets radically, Johnston would say -
programmatically, the philosophical organon is thought as the product or
effect of a poiesis, as work [Werk) or as poetical opus ... Philosophy must
effectuate itself - complete, fulfill, and realize itself - as poetry ... [Litera-
ture, as its own infinite questioning and as the perpetual positing of its own
question, dates from romanticism and as romanticism. [This means that] the
romantic question, the question of romanticism, does not and cannot have
an answer. Or, at least that its answer can only be interminably deferred,
continually deceiving, endlessly recalling the question ... This is why
romanticism, which is actually a moment (the moment of its question) will
always have been more than a mere "epoch," or else it will never cease,
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right up to the present, to incomplete the epoch it inaugurated ... Romantic
criticism - and indeed criticism and poetics since romanticism - conceives
of itself as the construction of the classical work to come. This is also why,
with regard to romantic poetry "itself," criticism in turn possesses its own
superior and as yet unactualized status: that of this "divinatory criticism,"
which alone (again in Athenaeum fragment 116) "would dare to charac-
terize" the ideal of such a "poetry."30
In their present meditation on what it is like to bear this sort of
subjectivity, scrutinizing itself and its possibilities through this form
of philosophico-poetico-critical thinking, Lacoue-Labarthe and
Nancy begin from a question about the meaning and importance of
opsis - staging or spectacle (it makes a difference which term we
choose) - in Aristotle's Poetics. Tragic drama, Aristotle claims,
essentially takes place through staging, yet staging as spectacle is
nonetheless secondary and inessential to tragedy and its proper
effects.
For Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, this issue in the Poetics about the
nature and importance of staging is but one side of a much larger
issue: what is the nature and function of performance in the
construction of a human subjectivity and its life? Their turn to this
larger issue is motivated by the fact that the French word "scene,"
which translates one sense of Aristotle's opsis (stage or staging, not
performance or spectacle) is also the word in psychoanalytic theory
in French that describes the place of the formation of subject
identity: 7a scene originaire, the primal, Oedipal scene. (Their essay
was first published in French in a 1992 issue of Nouvelle revue de
psychanalyse devoted to "The Primal Scene and Some Others.")
Against the background of their post-Kantian concerns, Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy then see the scene (primal and otherwise) as the
place of the continual coming-to-be of the subject. The work done in
this scene is characterized by a dialectic of order and disorder
(Seyhan), by a mixture of coercion and free consent (Fischer), by
productive imagination acting under constraints set by materiality
and tradition (Danto, Fleischacker). It is a place of the performance
(Altieri) of identity, including gender identity (Battersby) and voice
(Danto), wherein subjects bear both a double consciousness of their
possibilities (Bates, Eldridge) and guilt (Johnston), wherein they are
locked in relations of confession and forgiveness, sustained or
refused (Bernstein).
Given all this, how is the work of subject formation best to be
done? Here Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy divide themselves in their
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exchange of letters. ("A dialogue is a chain or garland of fragments.
An exchange of letters is a dialogue on a larger scale," as Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy cite Schlegel's Athenaeum fragment 77 in The
Literary Absolute.31) "I always," Nancy writes, "take the side of the
opsis and you the side of the 'solitary reading.'" As Nancy develops
this stance, it emerges that this side, the side of opsis, involves a
commitment to the values of spectacle, free performativism, and the
enunciatory gesture (wherein meaning is not readily parted from
effect or from touch) in the enactment of subjectivity. Occupying this
stance means conceiving the subject as itself not a fixed point of
origin of performances, but instead as something wholly caught up
and constituted "in a game, in an exchange, in a circulation, and in a
community which depends on an economy completely different
from that of subjective representation [i.e. from a unified, punctual
subject's having of ideas]." Here we may think naturally of Nietzsche
in The Birth of Tragedy on the Dionysian and its form of fragmented,
collective subjectivity.
Against this stance, Lacoue-Labarthe urges "a principle of re-
straint in art." Lacoue-Labarthe does not deny that we are always
becoming what we are in and through scenes of performance. There
is no reversion to a Cartesian conception of subjectivity. "I am ...
fully convinced that we are at the end of a subjectivity understood
as a self-presence which supports presentations and brings them
back as one's own - this subjectivity being, precisely, unpresen-
table," Nancy writes, enunciating the Kantian and post-Kantian
conception of the subject described in The Literary Absolute, and
Lacoue-Labarthe apparently accepts this. But, while accepting sub-
jectivity as always coming to be in and through a scene of its
staging, Lacoue-Labarthe nonetheless resists the values of performa-
tivism and open, unleashed figurality. Such unleashed figurality, an
attempt to think and embrace the figurality of figure, involves,
according to Lacoue-Labarthe, a potentially dangerous, Heideg-
gerian "sacralization or mythologization" of figural breaks from the
tradition and the ordinary - figural breaks that threaten to undo
everything that is, all partial identity and all partially free culture,
far too apocalyptically. Unleashed figurality as a positive value
threatens to make "a religion of the unpresentable," threatens to
enact an empty and dangerous sublime. At the very least, too much
figurality and openness in performance, and too little concern for
tradition, for the ordinary, and for the real as it has so far presented
itself in and through culture, supports, Lacoue-Labarthe suggests, a
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certain "sentimentality" and "an expressionistic weakness" in
thinking about our possibilities of character and culture. We would
be better off, Lacoue-Labarthe asserts, to keep to a certain normative
principle of sobriety and restraint in our performances of ourselves
and our culture - a stance that we can recognize as urging the
values of the Apollonian sensibility as Nietzsche describes it in The
Birth of Tragedy.
Is there, then, any way to reconcile these stances on the perfor-
mances of subjectivity and of culture, any way to resolve the
question about how being-in-common (etre-en-commuri), both
within oneself and with others, might best, even if fitfully, be
achieved? Near the end of their exchange, Nancy writes that "an
antinomy, if you will, of perceptions and affections" inhabits their
exchange and makes there to be this scene - this staging of oneself
for and to and with another - between them. This seems right, as
their exchange enacts the sense that questions about how best to go
on reforming our partially integrated, partially free, but also partially
self-opposed, partially unfree, subjectivities and cultures as they
stand must always remain open for us.
Ill
Many of these essays - and most especially the exchange between
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy - display a critical and philosophical
performativism, particularly when contrasted with more routinized
forms of professional philosophical thinking and expression. Truth
is here pursued through criticism, and articulation, and envisioning,
not through any attempt neutrally to measure and trace what is
independently materially real. In these pursuits, varieties of voice
and sensibility become strongly evident, as the writers of these
essays enact - stage, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy might say - their
respective subjectivities.
A certain careful, materialist cast of mind will find these pursuits
suspicious, and it will seek, perhaps, to reduce these enactments of
sensibility to the expressions of mere preferences (it will say)
somehow formed elsewhere - in either material nature or material
social life. One ambition of this collection is to make that reduction
harder to sustain, by presenting essays - enactments or stagings or
envisionings - of such depth and richness that it is hard to reduce
them away and to deny the reality of always enacted-enacting
subjectivity. On their showings, we are human subjects in and
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through the tangled, self-opposed, work of poiesis, aimed at our-
selves in our culture and our culture in ourselves, and the work of
poiesis lasts a long time.
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